Religion, Suffering, and the Social Strata

Since moving to the United States from the Philippines four years ago, I have noticed major differences between the two countries’ religious practices. The spattering of different religious practices here in the United States differs greatly from the Philippines, where Roman Catholicism is the majority religion. More than 80 percent of Filipinos are Roman Catholic, and the practice of the religion grows stronger each and every day. I remember my grandmother yelling at me, “Stop playing and come inside right now, it’s 6pm!” “Why?” “You may bump into evil spirits and only God knows what will happen to you, I don’t want you hurt.” It seems ridiculous now that I think about it, but I obeyed, nonetheless. Max Weber, author of “The Social Psychology of World Religions,” theorizes the dogma of religion, history of suffering, and the ideology of a redeemer.

Weber proposes that religion is one of the foundations of social structures and of its economic ethics. In the beginning, however, these religions were mainly exclusive. For example, Confucianism was followed by prebendaries, or Christianity was the doctrine of artisan journeymen; and because of its exclusiveness, the social strata, or the division between classes, was created. Later, suffering became a dogma of the strata.

The view of suffering has been altered throughout the course of history. Long before religion was rationalized, a person in suffering was either seen as being in compensation for having offended the gods, or under the possession of the devil -- just like what my grandmother had implied. Later, suffering became one of the excuses or reasons behind the inequality of the divided society. In this society, there were the fortunate and the unfortunate. The former were blessed and privileged; however, this made them uncertain about their good fortune. They questioned whether they had indubitably and undeniably deserve what they have. They began to rationalize; they gave reason that the unfortunate were paying dues; they were the opposite of the fortunate because they were suffering. This belief made religion a stronger reason behind the inequality of life, yet it seems irrational to why the privileged had to reassure themselves in the first place. If religion was the foundation or even merely a factor of the social strata, then why the insecurity about the good fortune? Later, however and after several rationalizations, suffering was seen as salvation.

Under the constant strain of ill fortune and uncertainty, people have come to create and justify the ideology of a redeemer -- the one who would deliver people from their sufferings. This idea grew stronger as time progressed, and people began to hope that rationality could finally be seen in their beliefs. One example of a redeemer is Jesus Christ. He had come to save people from their sins and He had died on the cross for salvation. Salvation from self-inflicted faults and irrationality? What rationality is there, when religion is currently seen as fundamentally irrational? Added to that, people began asceticism, or voluntary suffering. What is the reason behind this? Weber states that, “the prestige of these chastisements has resulted from the notion that certain kinds of suffering and abnormal states provoked through chastisement are avenues to the attainment of superhuman, that is magical, powers (271).” These magical powers seem contradictory to the advancement. Weren’t people rationalizing the view of religion? And wasn’t the view of salvation the mere request of material happiness, of reason behind inequality? Would asceticism be a path to see equality?

The changes in the ideology of suffering can come across some contradiction. The primitive view is that suffering was done by demons and other menacing spirits. Later, the concept of suffering evolved into the theory that there was reason behind inequality. Finally, the concept of suffering is now viewed as a path to salvation as seen when Jesus Christ died on the cross to save humanity.



Weber, Max. "The Social Psychology of World Religions." 270 - 276.